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INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS. Democratic Procedure
under the Constitution of the United States. By WALLACE MCCLURE.1
New York: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1941. pp. xxii, 449. $4.75.
This volume presents a crusade in the name of democracy against
the constitutional provision that the ratification of treaties requires the
advice and consent of a two-thirds majority of the Senate, and on be-
half of the author's proposal that the executive agreement be substituted
for treaties, thus dispensing with Senate participation in international
compacts. The author, in making these proposals, is motivated by his
,resentment against the failure of the League of Nations to obtain a
two-thirds majority in the Senate, although that failure was apparently
ratified by popular vote in the 1920 election. Perhaps to get around this
disturbing fact, Dr. McClure says: "Minority control over treaties in
the Senate does not lead to the realization of the people's considered, as
opposed to their passing, will." 2 His solution of the supposed consti-
tutional dilemma which he thus posits is the executive agreement, with
Congress if necessary, without Congress if possible. He says: "The
President can do by executive agreement anything that he can do by
treaty, provided Congress by law co6perates. And there is a very wide
field of action in which the co6peration of Congress is not necessary;
indeed where Congress possesses no constitutional authority to dis-
sent.'" 3 Thus, while conceding the possible necessity or desirability on
occasion of Congressional "authorization" (as in the Trade Agreements
Acts of 1934, 1937 and 1940), his real thesis, generally undisguised, is
that the President alone, through the executive agreement, has full
power to commit the United States to any international engagement; and
that such executive agreement should have the constitutional force of a
treaty, establishing domestic law, prevailing over state legislation and
perhaps overruling earlier legislation of Congress. He is in some doubt
on the latter point, and here would concede the desirability of Congres-
sional approval of the executive agreement.
He claims for the executive agreement great flexibility, speedy ac-
tion in a world of dictators, the avoidance of delays incidental to delib-
eration, etc. "Action" is the thing. just how one man government is
more democratic than the present method requiring two-thirds consent
of the Senate is not made clear. The author undertakes to sustain his
1. United States Department of State.
2. Pp. 367-368.
3. P. 363.
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thesis by citing the facts that some 1200 executive agreements have been
entered into as against only about 800 treaties; that a "Constitutional
usage" accepts the executive agreement as a regular mode of interna-
tional compact; that there is nothing in the Constitution which prevents
the President from making such agreements; and that he is the reposi-
tory of the executive power and the authorized agent or organ for con-
ducting the foreign relations of the country. Moreover, he points out
that in both the Curtiss-Wright4 and Belmont5 cases, the Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice Sutherland, expressed strong approval of a wide
executive power in foreign affairs and in the latter case sustained the
law-making character of the Litvinoff-Roosevelt executive agreement.
Had the author had before him the decision of the majority justices in
United States v. Pink,6 decided February 2, 1942, his cup of joy would
doubtless have been full to overflowing. He would allow some small
scope for treaties and therefore for Senate consent in routine and non-
controversial matters "about which no public opinion exists and no ques-
tion as to their acceptability- arises."7 For controversial matters, the
Senate method "may well be quietly abandoned," and the executive
agreement used instead. Thus, when debate and deliberation are most
vital, the President alone shall decide; when the matter is unimportant,
Senate participation may be permitted. I thought only totalitarian chiefs
argued thus. The author does not tell us how to distinguish a contro-
versial from a routine matter, but presumably the President also would
decide that.
This reviewer considers the author's purpose, to evade the treaty-
making power by conferring still more power on the executive, as un-
fortunate advice in constitutional theory and practice. The evidence
cited in support of the thesis is inconclusive if not indeed often inap-
posite. The Senate in my opinion performed a nationally useful serv-
ice in rejecting American participation in the political League of Na-
tions-another tenant in a house built on sand would not have saved it
from collapse. The author evidently assumes that practically all executive
agreements are models of good judgment, whereas I would contend that
not a few are unfortunate and would probably not have obtained Senate
approval, if submitted. The executive agreement of May 19, 1927, by
which the executive practically abandoned millions of dollars of claims
against Great Britain arising out of violations of American neutral rights
may be cited among others. That agreement did much damage to Ameri-
4. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
5. United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1937).
6. 62 Sup. Ct. 552 (1942).
7. P. 378.
8. P. 378.
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can citizens as well as to international law, and transferred the contest
over maritime rights from the legal to the political field, with far-reaching
consequences. There is no proof that the Senate has abused its powers
by rejecting sound treaties; the author admits that in one day thirteen
were approved.
In marshalling his evidence of the so-called "constitutional usage"
of 'concluding executive agreements, the author fails to distinguish be-
tween, and cites indiscriminately, different kinds of executive agree-
ments: (1) those made under authority of Congress and implementing
an act or policy of Congress or ratified by Congress, and (2) those
made without Congressional support, authority or ratification. The
former, exemplified by tariff and postal agreements (of which there have
been over 300) far outnumber all others. Yet the impression is
sought to be conveyed that they all represent the "methodology" of
the executive agreement as an instrument of government, as an alterna-
tive to formal treaties. The second group largely covers matters dis-
tinctly within executive control, such as the recognition of foreign
governments, the receiving of foreign diplomatic representatives, in-
structions to our own diplomatic and consular offices, the settlement and
provision for the arbitration of claims against foreign governments in con-
nection with the executive function of protecting citizens abroad, and
armistice agreements made as Commander-in-Chief of armies in the field.
The President also has a large power of negotiating, but the glib as-
sumption that this necessarily confers the power finally to conclude all
agreements is unfounded. Texas and Hawaii were admitted by Con-
gress, not by the executive. This narrows the field of difficulty, doubt
or dispute to the question of the executive power to conclude political
agreements with foreign powers, and here we find that secrecy is one of
the great dangers of the executiye method. The Roosevelt-Katsura
Agreement of 1905 and the secret clause of the Lansing-Ishii Agree-
ment of 1917 were not disclosed for some years. Where the agreements
were published and allowed to stand, like the Root-Takahira Agreement
of 1908 and the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907, it may be assumed
that the Senate saw no reason to assert its prerogatives. Nor does the
fact that Congress often has to appropriate money or pass legislation in
execution of a treaty obligation assume the "superiority of Congress to
the treaty-making power."9 If the author thinks that "no more master-
ful opinion is recorded in judicial annals than that of John Marshall" in
Marbury v. Madison, he ought to read Professor McLaughlin's analysis
of that tour de force."° John Bassett Moore, " . . . one of the most
9. P. 60.
10. McLaughlin, Marbury vs. Madison Again (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 155.
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presninent of American jurisconsults .... -11 does not in any way
support Dr. McClure's general thesis. I have his permission to say that
he never intended by any of the passages quoted by Dr. McClure to con-
vey the opinion that any part of the treaty-making power under the Con-
stitution had been done away with or impaired by practice; and that,
without imputing to Dr. McClure any purpose to misrepresent what he
said, he thinks that the passages in question, when read in connection
with the context, do not sustain the theory of constitutional dilapidation
in support of which they are cited.
Confronted by the fact that numerous subjects, like extradition,
naturalization, consular privileges, treaties of peace, arbitration of claims
against the United States, and compacts modifying acts of Congress are
by "constitutional usage" embodied only in treaties and not in executive
agreements, Dr. McClure falls back on some doubtful aberrations, like
Lincoln's single and never repeated. surrender of a fugitive from jus-
tice,12 to maintain that all this could have been accomplished equally
well by executive agreement. Here "constitutional usage" has no ap-
peal for the author. On claims against the United States he might have
cited the Mexican Agreement of 1934 and the I'm Alone protocol of
arbitration, but these are exceptional and can be justified on treaty-in-
terpretation grounds.
The author finds his greatest moral support in the dicta of Justice
Sutherland in the Curtiss-Wright and Belmont cases,18 in which the
Court did express its approval of a wide executive power in dealing
with foreign affairs. In the former case it was only necessary to pass
upon the power of Congress to authorize, and the power of the Presi-
dent thereunder to impose, an impartial embargo on the belligerents in
the Chaco War if he thought this would be conducive to peace. The
pertinent remarks are actually confined to the plenary power of "nego-
tiation" and "inquiry," which obviously are exceedingly broad. But
Justice Sutherland went further and took occasion to read into his opin-
ion the substance of his Columbia Lectures (1918) on Constitutional
Power and World Affairs, in which he maintained, not the thesis of Dr.
McClure, but a very broad power of the federal government and the
President, independently of the Constitution, to deal with foreign af-
fairs. 'In the Belmont case, the executive agreement was indeed analo-
gized to a treaty in its capacity to override conflicting state law, a con-
clusion even more fully confirmed in United States v. Pink,'4 a case not
calling for any such pronouncement. In the latter opinion, the Litvinoff
11. P. 251. See also pp. 82, 331, where passages are quoted.
12. Pp. 333, 334-35.
13. See notes 4 and 5 spra.
14. See note 6 supra.
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Agreement was misconstrued; Russia was, erroneously it is sub~itted,
assumed to have successfully confiscated and assigned to the United
States property situated in this country of dissolved Russian corpora-
tions, and the executive was assumed to have power to confiscate pri-
vate property, notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment. Since I have
written a long editorial in criticism of that opinion in the April, 1942
issue of the American Journal of International Law, I refrain from say-
ing more here. The Court has inflated the executive power more even
than has Congress, with its attempted abdication of its war-making
powers. But it is submitted, this is not a fulfillment or construction of
the Constitution-rather it is a change in the Constitution, which calls
for nation-wide discussion.
It may well be that the original reasons for the two-thirds rule for
Senate consent to treaties no longer prevail, but this is true of many
rules of constitutional and statutory law and hardly justifies an uncon-
stitutional abrogation or abandonment of the constitutional method of
concluding international compacts with foreign countries. Dr. McClure,
an official of the State Department, has exerted great efforts to prove
his thesis, but this reviewer, after reading carefully every word written
by the learned author, remains convinced that the end is unsound, and
even if it were sound, does not justify the means.
EDWIN BoRcHARD*
* Professor of\Law, Yale Law School.
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION. By GEORGE T. WASH-
INGTON. 1 New York: RONALD PRESS COMPANY, 1942, pp. xii, 519.
$7.00.
Public interest in the compensation of corporate executives was
originally stimulated by the 1931 complaints in the Bethlehem Steel and
American Tobacco Company cases.2  Additional interest was aroused
when the Federal Trade Commission in 1934 secured and released fig-
ures on executive compensation-the first time this was done for any
large number of corporations. These figures Were thereafter supple-
mented and are currently kept up to date by reports filed with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission and available for inspection at its
offices. Since 1934, when stockholders were first permitted to learn
1. Professor of Law, Cornell University.
2. Berendt v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 108 N.J. Eq. 148, 154 Atl. 321 (1931);
Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y. S. (2d) 653 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (tracing history of the
American Tobacco Co. litigation from 1931 to date).
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